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Abstract—Packet dropping and modification are common attacks that can be launched by an adversary 
to disrupt communication in wireless multi-hop sensor networks. Many schemes have been proposed to 
mitigate the attacks but none can effectively and efficiently identify the intruders. To address the 
problem, we propose a simple yet effective scheme, which can identifymisbehaving forwarders that drop 
or modify packets. Extensive analysis and simulations using ns2 simulator have been conducted and 
verified the effectiveness and efficiency of the scheme. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Wireless Sensor Networks(WSN) are gaining 
importance recent years due to its impact on Cost, 
ability to cope up with node andcommunication 
failures, Mobility, Capability to withstand harsh 
environmental condition, monitoring purpose and 
Ease of use. Despite Sensor nodes large collection of 
benefits there are few constrains such as Security, 
Quality of Service and Resource constrains which act 
as hurdle in implementing sensor network application 
in real world environment. In a wireless sensor 
network, sensor nodes monitor theenvironment, detect 
events of interest, produce data and collaborate in 
forwarding the data towards a sink, which could be a 
gateway, base station, storage node, or querying user.  
A sensor network is often deployed in an unattended 
and hostile environment to perform the monitoring 
and data collection tasks. When it is deployed in such 
an environment, it lacks physical protection and is 
subject to node compromise. After compromising one 
or multiple sensor nodes, an adversary may launch 
various attacks [1] to disrupt the in-network 
communication. Among these attacks, two common 
ones are dropping packets and modifying packets, i.e., 
compromised nodes drop or modify the packets that 
they are supposed to forward.To deal with packet 
droppers, a widely adopted countermeasure is multi-
path forwarding [2], [3], in which eachpacket is 
forwarded along multiple redundant paths and hence 
packet dropping in some but not all of these paths can 
be tolerated. This scheme introduces high extra 
communication overhead.  
Another category of countermeasures is to monitor the 
behavior of forwarding nodes [4]–[6]. However, 
theseschemes are subject to high energy cost incurred 
by thepromiscuous operating mode of wireless 
interface. To dealwith packet modifiers, most of 
existing countermeasures [7]–[10] are to filter 
modified messages within a certain numberof hops. 
However, without identifying packet droppers 
andmodifiers, these countermeasures cannot fully 
solve the packet modification problems because the 
compromised nodes can continue attacking the 
network without being caught.  
To identify packet modifiers, Ye et al. [11] recently 
proposeda probabilistic nested marking (PNM) 
scheme to identifypacket modifiers with a certain 
probability. However, the PNM scheme cannot be 
used together with the false packet filtering schemes 
[7]–[10], because the filtering schemes will drop the 
modified packets which should be used by the PNM 
scheme as evidences to infer packet modifiers. This 
degrades the efficiency of deploying the PNM 
scheme. 
In this paper, we propose a simple yet effective 
schemeto catch both packet droppers and modifiers. 
According to the scheme, a dynamic routing tree 
rooted at the sink is firstestablished. When sensor data 
is transmitted along the tree structure towards the 
sink, each packet sender or forwarder adds a small 
number of extra bits, which is called packetmarks, to 
the packet. The format of the small packet marks is 
deliberately designed such that the sink can obtain 
veryuseful information from the marks. Specifically, 
based onthe packet marks, the sink can figure out the 
dropping rate associated with every sensor node, and 
then run our proposed node categorization algorithm 
to identify nodes that are droppers/modifiers for sure 
or are suspicious droppers/modifiers. 
As the tree structure dynamically changes every 
certain time interval, behaviours of sensor nodes can 
be observed in a large variety of scenarios. As the 
information of node behaviours has been 
accumulated, the sink periodically run our proposed 
heuristic ranking algorithms to identify most likely 
bad nodes from suspiciously bad nodes. This way, 
most of the bad nodes can be gradually identified with 
small false positive. 
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Compared with existing schemes, our scheme has the 
following unique characteristics: (1) being effective in 
identifyingboth packet droppers and modifiers, (2) 
low overhead in terms of both communication and 
energy consumption, and (3) being compatible with 
existing false packet filtering schemes [7]–[10]; that 
is, it can be deployed together with the false packet 
filtering schemes, and therefore can not only identify 
intruders but also filter modified packets immediately 
afterthe modification is detected. Extensive simulation 
on ns2simulator have been conducted to verify the 
effectiveness and efficiency of the proposed scheme 
in various scenarios. 
II. EXISTING IMPLEMENTATION 
Deployment phase is considered in node configuration 
which is further classified into Initialization and 
Transmission phase. 
Initialization Phase: In Initialization phase, sensor 
nodes are deployed in such as way it is a Directed 
Acyclic Graph and from that arouting tree is derived. 
The routing tree keeps on changing and routing 
behavior is gathered by the sink. Each node is pre-
loaded with a unique id (sequence number) as well as 
necessary keying materials which includes secret 
key,duration to establish pair wise key with other 
nodes. 
Transmission Phase:In transmission phase, packets 
from the sensor nodes are transmitted through the 
routing tree. Every nodecomputes two MAC, one 
using the key shared with the Base Station (BS) and 
the other using pair wise key that isshared. The node 
transmits the packet along with the MAC value 
produced and the forwarding node verifies the data 
integrity and after verifying the associated MAC value 
is removed and the corresponding nodes MAC is 
included and forwarded to the sink. Base Station also 
verifies data integrity. 
Compromised Nodes Identification Phase: The 
routing tree is reshaped and compromised nodes are 
identified using NHCH. In NHCH scheme packet 
droppers or modifiers are found by clustering the 
nodes depending on the risk factor and dropping ratio 
as good, moderate or bad. After finding, the nodes are 
further ranked to identify most nodes that are sure to 
drop packets. 
Ranking Technique: A routing table is maintained 
and an accused account is maintained in which nodes 
are ranked depending ontheir identification to be bad 
for several times. The most accused value node is 
fixed to be bad for sure. The accusedvalue of nodes is 
reduced by the number of times it has been found 
together along with the bad node. 
Secure Routing Process: After identifying the 
compromised nodes a secure route is provided for 
data transmission. Route is initially discovered and 
later the founded route is maintained. 
Route Discovery and Maintenance: To initiate the 
Route Discovery, node transmits a "Route Request" as 
a single local broadcast packet, which isreceived by 
(approximately) all nodes currently on the 
transmission range.  
Security Assumptions and Attack Model: We assume 
the network sink is trustworthy and free 
ofcompromise, but regular sensor nodes can be 
compromised.Compromised nodes may or may not 
collude with each other. 
A compromised node can launch the following two 
attacks: 
Packet dropping:A compromised node drops all or 
some of the packets that it is supposed to forward. It 
may also drop the data generated by itself for some 
malicious purpose such as accusing innocent nodes. 
Packet modification:A compromised node modifies 
all or some of the packets that it is supposed to 
forward. It may also modify the data it generates to 
protect itselffrom being identified or to accuse other 
nodes. 
III. IMPLEMENTATION MODEL 
In our scheme for identifying packet droppers and 
modifiers,a system initialization phase is followed by 
several equalduration rounds of intruder identification 
phases. 
† In the initialization phase, sensor nodes form a 
dynamic routing tree rooted at the sink. The structure 
of the tree changes dynamically from round to round. 
† In each round, data traffic is transmitted through the 
routing tree to the sink, and each packet 
sender/forwarder adds a small number of extra bits to 
the packet and also encrypts the packet. When one 
round finishes, based on the extra bits carried in the 
received packets, the sink runs the node categorization 
algorithm to identify nodesthat must be droppers or 
modifiers and nodes that aresuspiciously bad. 
† The routing tree is reshaped every round. As a 
certain number of rounds have passed, the sink will 
have collected information about node behaviors in 
different routing topologies. The information includes 
which nodes are bad for sure, which nodes are 
suspiciously bad, and thenodes’ topological 
relationship. To further identify badnodes from the 
potentially large number of suspiciouslybad nodes, the 
sink runs heuristic ranking algorithms. 
In the following sub-sections, we first present the 
algorithmfor tree establishment and packet 
transmission, which is followed by our proposed 
categorization algorithm, tree structure reshaping 
algorithm, and heuristic ranking algorithms. To ease 
the presentation, we first concentrate on packet 
droppers and assume no node collusion. After that, we 
present how to extend the presented scheme to handle 
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node collusion and detect packet modifiers, 
respectively. 
A. Tree Establishment and Packet Transmission 
All sensor nodes form a tree rooted at the sink. The 
sink knows the tree topology and shares a unique key 
with each node on the tree. When a node wants to 
send out a packet, it attaches to the packet a sequence 
number, encrypts the packet with the key shared with 
the sink, and then forwards the packet to its parent. 
When an innocent intermediate nodereceives a packet, 
it attaches a few bits to the packet to markthe 
forwarding path of the packet, encrypts the packet, 
andthen forwards the packet to its parent. On the 
contrary, a misbehaving intermediate node may drop a 
packet it receives. 
On receiving a packet, the sink decrypts it, and thus 
finds outthe original sender and the packet sequence 
number. The sink keeps tracking the sequence 
numbers of received packets for every node, and for 
every certain time interval, which we call a round, it 
calculates the packet dropping rate for every node. 
Based on the dropping rate and the knowledge of tree 
topology, the sink identifies packet droppers based on 
rules we derive. Indetail, the scheme includes the 
following components, which are elaborated in the 
following. 
1) System Initialization: The purpose of system 
initialization is to set up secret pair-wise keys between 
the sink and every regular sensor node, and to 
establish a tree to facilitate packet forwarding from 
every sensor node to the sink.  
Preloading Keys and Other System Parameters Each 
sensor node u is preloaded the following information: 
† Ku: a secret key exclusively shared between the 
node and the sink. 
† Np: the maximum number of candidate parent nodes 
that each sensor node records during the tree 
establishment procedure. 
† Ns: the maximum packet sequence number. For 
each sensor node, its first packet has sequence number 
0, the N
th
spacket is numbered Ns ¡ 1, the (Ns + 1)th 
packet is numbered 0, and so on and so forth. 
Tree Establishment:After deployment, the sink 
broadcasts to its one-hop neighbours a 2-tuple h0; 0i. 
In the 2-tuple, the first field is the ID ofthe sender 
(We assume the ID of sink is 0.) and the secondfield 
is its distance in hop from the sender to the sink. 
Eachof the remaining nodes, assuming its ID is u, acts 
as follows: 
(i) On receiving the first 2-tuple hv; dvi, node u sets 
its own distance to the sink as du = dv + 1. 
(ii) Node u records each node w (including node v) 
as its parent if it has received hw; dwiwhere dw= 
dv. If the number of recorded parents is greater 
than Np, only Np parents are kept, and others are 
discarded. The actual number of parents it has 
recorded is denoted by np;u. 
After a certain time interval1, node u broadcasts 2-
tuple hu; dui to its one-hop neighbors. Then, among 
the recorded parents, node u randomly picks one 
(whose ID is denoted as Pu) as its actual parent, and a 
random number (which is denoted as Ru) between 0 
and Np ¡ 1. 
Finally, node u sends Pu, Ru and all np;u recorded 
parents to the sink. 
After the above procedure completes, a tree rooted at 
the sink is established. The sink also knows the 
topology of the trees from the reports it has received 
from every node. Note that the sink not only knows 
the current tree structure, but also the parents recorded 
by each node. 
2) Packet Sending and Forwarding: Each node 
maintains a counter C p which keeps track of the 
number of packets that it has sent so far. When a 
sensor node u has a data item D to report, it composes 
and sends the following packet to its parent node Pu: 
hPu; fRu; u; CpMOD Ns; D; padu;0gKu; padu;1i; 
where C p MOD Ns is the sequence number of the 
packet. Ru is a random number between 0 and N p ¡ 1 
picked by node u during tree establishment. FXgY 
represents the result of encrypting X using key Y . 
Padding padu;0 and padu;1 are added to make all 
packets equal length, such that forwarding nodes 
cannot tell packet sources based on packet length. 
Meanwhile, the sink can still decrypt the packet to 
find out the actual content. To satisfy these two 
objectives simultaneously, the padding is constructed 
as follows: 
† For a packet sent by a node which is h hops away 
from the sink, the length of padu;1 is log(Np) ⁄ (h ¡ 1) 
bits. 
As to be described later, when a packet is forwarded 
for one hop, log(Np) bits information will be added 
and meanwhile, log(Np) bits will be chopped. 
† Let the maximum size of a packet be Lpbits, a node 
ID be Lid bits and data D be LD bits. padu;0 should 
be L p ¡ Lid ⁄ 2 ¡ log(Np) ⁄ h ¡ log(Ns) ¡ LD bits, where 
Lid ⁄ 2 bits are for Pu and u fields in the packet, field 
Ru is log(Np) bits long, field padu;1 is log(Np)⁄(h¡1) 
bits long, and CpMOD Ns is log(Ns). Setting padu;0 
to this value ensures that all packets have the same 
size Lp. When a sensor node v receives packet hv; mi, 
it composes and forwards the following packet to its 
parent node Pv: hPv; fRv; m0gKvi;where m0 is 
obtained by trimming the rightmost log(Np) bits off 
m. Meanwhile, Rv, which has log Np bits, is added to 
the front of m0. Hence, the size of the packet keeps 
unchanged. 
3) Packet Receipt at the Sink: We use node 0 to 
denote the sink. When the sink receives a packet h0; 
mi, it conducts the following steps:  
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1The length of the interval is a predefined system 
parameter that is large enough for each node to 
receive an enough number of broadcasts from the 
nodes closer to the sink.  
(i) Initialization: We introduce two temporary 
variables u and m0. Let u = 0 and m0 = m. 
(ii) The sink attempts to find out a child of node u, 
denoted as v, such that dec(Kv; m) results in a string 
starting with Rv, where dec(Kv; m) means the result of 
decrypting m with key Kv. 
 
Fig. 1 Packet Transmission process 
(iii) If the attempt fails, the packet is identified as 
being modified and thus should be dropped. 
 (iv) If the attempt succeeds, it indicates that the 
packet was forwarded from node v to node u. Now, 
there are two cases: 
– If dec(Kv; m) starts with hRv; vi, it indicates that 
node v is the original sender of the packet. The 
sequence number of the packet is recorded for further 
calculation and the receipt procedure completes. 
– Otherwise, it indicates that node v is an intermediate 
forwarder of the packet. Then, u is updated to be v, 
m0 is updated to be the string obtained by trimming 
Rvfrom the leftmost. Then, steps (ii)-(iv) are repeated. 
4) An Example: Fig 2 shows an example sensor 
network with 7 nodes, node 0 ¡ 6. Node ID is 
represented by 3 bits. 
Suppose the maximum packet sequence number Ns is 
16 and 4 bits are used to represent the counter Cp. Np, 
the maximum number of parents that each sensor 
node should record during the tree establishment, is 4. 
We assume that the length of sensory data LD is 8 
bits. In this figure, we illustrate the procedure when 
node 5, which is 2 hops away from the sink, generates 
sensory data 96, how the data is sent to the sink node 
0. Assume currently, data from node 5 follows path 5-
>2->0 and Cp= 3. Node 5 constructs packet < Pu; 
fRu; u; CpMOD Ns; D; padu;0gKu; padu;1 >;  
The plain-text of the packet is shown in the figure as 
P1. 
Specifically, Pu = 2(010), Ru = 1(01), u = 5(101), 
Cp=3(0011), and D = 96(01100000). The length of 
the paddings are calculated as follows. Assume that 
the maximum packet size Lpis 24 bits. The length of 
pad5;1 should be log Np ⁄(h ¡ 1) bits, that is 2 bits. The 
length of pad5;0 should beL p ¡ Lid ⁄ 2 ¡ log Np ⁄ h ¡ 
log Ns ¡ LD, that is, 24 ¡ 3 ⁄ 2 ¡ 2⁄2¡4¡8 = 2 bits. Based 
on P1, node 5 uses its secret key K5 to encrypt part of 
P 1, fR5; 5; CpMOD Ns; D; pad5;0g. 
The cipher-text is represented by C1 and the 
encrypted packet P 2 is constructed accordingly. P2 is 
sent to node 2. 
When node 2 receives packet P 2, it first chops the 
rightmost log Np bits, which is 2 bits of the paddings. 
Next, node 2 constructs packet P 3 by adding its 
parent ID and the random number R2 to the front of 
cipher-text C1. Note that the packet length is kept the 
same since the right most 2 bits is chopped, and 2 bits 
random number R2 is added. Next, node 2 uses its 
secret key K2 to encrypt information fR2; C1g in 
packet P 3 and generates packet P 4. P 4 is then sent 
to the sink.  
After the sink receives the packet P 4 from its 
children, the sink tries to figure out the sender. The 
sink tries to decrypt the cipher-text C2 by using its 
children’s secret keys one by one. The sink finds that 
the packet is from node 2 after C2 is decrypted by 
using K2. The sink also recovers the decrypted C2 
which does not starts with fR2; 2g. (Note that, the sink 
and each sensor node are synchronized and they 
follow an implicit tree reshaping algorithm. The 
random number R2 is also known by the sink.) The 
sink concludes that node 2 is an intermediate node. It 
continues this process and finds out the source of the 
data is node 5. 
B. Node Categorization AlgorithmIn every round, 
for each sensor node u, the sink keeps track of the 
number of packets sent from u, the sequence numbers 
of these packets and the number of flips in the 
sequence numbers of these packets, (i.e., the sequence 
number changes from a large number such as Ns ¡ 1 
to a small number such as 0). 
In the end of each round, the sink calculates the 
dropping rate for each node u. Suppose nu;maxis the 
most recently seen sequence number, nu;flipis the 
number of sequence number flips and nu;rcvis the 
number of received packets. 
The dropping ratio in this round is calculated as 
follows: 
 
Based on the dropping rate of every sensor node and 
the tree topology, the sink identifies the nodes that are 
droppers for sure and that are possibly droppers. For 
this purpose, a threshold θ is first introduced. We 
assume that if a node’s packets are not intentionally 
dropped by forwarding nodes, the dropping rate of 
this node should be lower than θ. Note that θ should 
be greater than 0, taking into account droppings 
caused by incidental reasons such as collisions. The 
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first step of the identification is to mark each node 
with ―+‖ if its dropping ratio is lower than θ, or with 
―-‖ otherwise. After all nodes have been marked with 
―+‖ or ―-‖, we can identify the following patterns for 
each node, which are also Illustrated by Fig.2 
†  The node and its one or more continuous 
immediate upstream nodes are marked as ―+‖. 
†  The node is marked as ―+‖, but its one or 
more continuous immediate upstream nodes are 
marked as ―-‖. 
 
Fig. 2 Pattern on Different Nodes 
C. Tree Reshaping and Three Ranking Algorithms 
The tree used to forward data is dynamically changed 
from round to round, which enables the sink to 
observe the behaviour of every sensor node in a large 
variety of routing topologies. 
For each of these scenarios, node categorization 
algorithm is applied to identify sensor nodes that are 
bad for sure or suspiciously bad. After multiple 
rounds, sink further identifies bad nodes from those 
are suspiciously bad by applying several proposed 
heuristic methods. 
1) Tree Reshaping: The tree used for forwarding data 
from sensor nodes to the sink is dynamically changed 
from round to round. In other words, each sensor node 
may have a different parent node from round to round. 
To let the sink and the nodes have a consistent view of 
their parent nodes, the tree is reshaped as follows. At 
the beginning of each round i (i= 1; 2; ¢ ¢ ¢ ), node u 
picks the [hi(Ku) MOD np;u]th parent node as its 
parent node for this round, where h is a hash function 
and hi(Ku) = h(hi¡1(Ku)). Note that, how the parents 
are selected is predetermined by both the preloaded 
secret Ku and the list of parents recorded in the tree 
establishment phase. The selection is known by the 
sink. 
Therefore, a misbehaving node cannot arbitrarily 
select its parent in favor of its attacks. 
2) Identifying Most Likely Bad Nodes from 
Suspiciously Bad Nodes: After a round ends, the sink 
calculates the dropping rate of each node, and runs 
node categorization algorithm to identify nodes that 
are bad for sure or suspiciously bad. 
Since the number of suspiciously bad nodes are 
potentially large, we propose how to identify most 
likely bad nodes from the suspiciously bad nodes as 
follows. By examining the rules in Case 3 and Case 4 
for identifying suspiciously bad nodes, we can see 
that, in each of these cases  
(i) there are two nodes, denoted as u and v, which 
have the same probability to be the bad nodes and  
(ii) at least one of them must be bad. We call these 
two nodes as a suspicious pair. For each round i, all 
identified suspicious pairs are recorded in a suspicious 
set denoted as Si = fhuj; vjijhuj; vjiis a suspicious pair 
and huj; vji=hvj; ujig. Therefore, after n rounds of 
detection, we can obtain a series of suspicious sets: 
S1; S2; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; Sn. We define S as the set of most 
likely bad nodes identified from S1; S2; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; Sn, if 
S has the following properties: 
† Coverage. 8hu; vi 2 Si (i= 1; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; n), it must hold 
that either u 2 S or v 2 S. That is, for any identified 
suspicious pair, at least one of the nodes in the pair 
must be in the set of most likely bad nodes. 
† Most-likeliness. 8hu; vi 2 Si (i= 1; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; n), if u 2 S 
but v 62 S, then u must have higher probability to be 
bad than v based on n rounds of observation. 
† Minimality. The size of S should be as small as 
possible in order to minimize the probability of mis-
accusing 
innocent nodes. 
Among the above three conditions, the first one and 
the third one can be relatively easily implemented and 
verified. For the second condition, we propose several 
heuristics to find nodes with most-likeliness. 
Global Ranking-Based (GR) Method The GR method 
is based on the heuristic that, the more times a node is 
identified as suspiciously bad, the more likely it is a 
bad node. With this method, each suspicious node u is 
associated with an accused account which keeps track 
of the time that the node has been identified as 
suspiciously bad nodes. To find out the most likely set 
of suspicious nodes after n rounds of detection, as 
described in Algorithm 1, all suspicious nodes are 
ranked based on the descending order of the values of 
their accused accounts. The node with the highest 
value is chosen as a most likely bad node and all the 
pairs that contain this node are removed from S1; ¢ ¢ 
¢ ; Sn, resulting in new sets. The process continues on 
the new sets until all suspicious pairs have been 
removed. 
 
Stepwise Ranking-Based (SR) method: It can be 
anticipated that the GR method will misaccuse 
innocent nodes that have frequently been parents or 
childrenof bad nodes: as parents or children of bad 
nodes, accordingto previously-described rules in 
Cases 3 and 4, the innocentscan often be classified as 
suspiciously bad nodes. To reduce misaccusation, we 
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propose the SR method. With the SRmethod, the node 
with the highest accused account value is still 
identified as a most likely bad node. However, once a 
bad nodeu is identified, for any other node v that has 
been suspectedtogether with node u, the value of node 
v’s accused accountis reduced by the times that u and 
v have been suspectedtogether. This adjustment is 
motivated by the possibility thatv has been framed by 
node u. After the adjustment, the nodethat has the 
highest value of accused account among the restnodes 
is identified as the next mostly like bad node, whichis 
followed by the adjustment of the accused account 
valuesfor the nodes that have been suspected together 
with thenode. Note that, similar to the GR  method, 
after a node uis identified as bad, all suspicious pairs 
with format hu; ⁄iare removed from S1; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; Sn. The 
above process continues until all suspicious pairs have 
been removed. The SR method isformally presented 
in Algorithm 2. 
Hybrid Ranking-Based (HR) Method 
 
The GR method can detect most bad nodes with some 
misaccusations while the SR method has fewer 
misaccusations but may not detect as many bad nodes 
as the GR method. To balance the tradeoff, we further 
propose the HR method, which is formally presented 
in Algorithm 3. According to HR, the node with the 
highest accused account value is still first chosen as 
most likely bad node. After a most likely bad node 
has been chosen, the one has the highest accused 
account value among the rest is chosen only if the 
node has not always been accused together with the 
bad nodes that have been identified already. Thus, the 
accusation account value is considered as an 
important criterion in identification, as in the GR 
method; meanwhile, the possibility that an innocent 
node being framed by bad nodes is also considered by 
not choosing the nodes who have always being 
suspected together with already-identified bad nodes, 
as in the SR method. 
 
D. Handling CollusionCompromised nodes that are 
located close with each othermay collude to render the 
sink to mis-accuse some innocentnodes. The attackers 
do not gain any benefit if the collusiontriggers the 
scenarios of Case 1 and Case 2. However, they 
canmis-accuse honest nodes if the collusion triggers 
the scenariosof Case 3 and Case 4. As a general 
example shown in Fig. 4,if nodes B, C and D are 
compromised and collude, theywill drop all or some 
of the packets of their own and theirdownstream 
nodes. Consequently, according to the rules inCase 3, 
hA; Bi, hA; Ci and hA; Di are all identified as pairs 
ofsuspiciously bad nodes. Since A has been suspected 
for moretimes than B, C and D, it is likely that A is 
mis-accused as bad node. Similarly, if nodes B and E 
are compromised and collude, B may drop some 
packets of itself and its downstream 
nodes, and then E further drops packets from B and its 
downstream nodes including E and E’s downstream 
nodes. 
Consequently, the dropping rates for E and its 
downstream nodes are higher than that for node A. 
According to Case 4, hE; Ai and hA; Bi are both 
identified as pairs of suspiciously bad nodes. Since A 
has been suspected for more times than B andE, it is 
likely to be identified as bad node. 
 
Fig. 3. Collusion Scenarios 
 
To defeat collusion that may lead to mis-accusation, 
ourscheme is extended as follows: 
† The concept of suspicious pair is extended to 
suspicious tuple which is a non-ordered sequence of 
suspicious nodes. Note that, a suspicious pair is a 
special case of suspicious tuple,i.e., suspicious 2-
tuple. 
† A new rule is introduced: for each round i, if there 
exists multiple suspicious tuples of which 
each contains a certain node u, hu; v1;1, ¢ ¢ ¢ , 
v1;m1i; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; hu; vn;1; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; vn;mni, all these 
tuples should be combined into a single tuple without 
duplication. For example, if the original tuples are hu; 
v1i, hu; v2; v3i and hu; v3i, these tuples will be 
replaced with hu; v1; v2; v3i, where each of the four 
nodes is suspected for only once. As to be shown in 
our simulation results, the above enhancement can 
deal with collusions at the cost of slightly degraded 
detection rate. 
E. An Extension for Identifying Packet Modifiers If a 
compromised node modifies the packets that it is 
supposed to forward, the node can be detected with 
the aforedescribed scheme. This is because, modified 
packets will be detected by the sink and thus be 
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dropped(detailed in step(iii) of the packet receipt 
procedure at sink). This is equivalent to that the 
packets are dropped by the modifier; hence, the packet 
modifier can be identified as a packet dropper. 
However, detecting modifiers in this way is not ideal 
because modified packets cannot be identified earlier 
by en-route nodes to save energy and bandwidth 
consumption. To enable en-route detection of 
modifications, the afore-described procedures for 
packet sending and forwarding can be slightly 
modified as follows. When a node u has a data item D 
to report, it can obtain endorsement message 
authentication codes (MACs) from its neighbors, 
which are denoted as MAC(D), following existing 
en-route filtering schemes such as the statistical en-
route filtering scheme (SEF) [7] and the interleaved 
hop-by-hop authentication scheme [8]. The source 
node u generates and sends the following packet to its 
parent node Pu: hPu; D; MAC(D); fRu; u; CpMOD 
Ns; padu;0gKu; padu;1i: When packet hv; D; 
MAC(D); mi is received by an enroute node v, node v 
can check the integrity of D in the same way as in 
existing packet filtering schemes [7], [8]. If a packet is 
found modified, it is immediately dropped; otherwise, 
the following packet is forwarded by v: hPv; D; 
MAC(D); fRv; m0gKvi; where m0 is constructed the 
same way from m as in the scheme to identify packet 
droppers 
IV. IMPACT ON NODES 
In the collusion attack model, shown as Fig. 4, three 
possible collusion cases can be as follows. 
Case 1: Node A, B, C and D are all compromised 
nodes: every node behaves normally without dropping 
their own packets and forwarding packets. In this 
attack model, these compromised nodes collude to 
protect themselves. 
Case 2: Node A is a good node and more than one of 
its child nodes is compromised: the compromised 
nodes drop their own packets and/or packets from 
their own children with the same dropping rate. In this 
attack model, these compromised nodes collude to 
frame the parent node A.  
Case 3: Node A is a good node but nodes B and Eare 
not. Both bad nodes B and E drop packets of their 
own and/or from their downstream nodes. As a result, 
the dropping ratesof B and its downstream nodes are 
the same, those of BandA are different, and those of B 
and E are also different. But the detection rate is still 
as high as 80% and a low false positive probability is 
maintained. The reason for lower detection rate can be 
explained as follows: When there are collusion, 
multiple colluding bad nodes and one ormore innocent 
nodes are put into a single tuple. However, ifthere is 
no collusion, generally there is only one bad nodein a 
tuple.  
Hence, the bad nodes’ overall times of being 
suspected is reduced when there is collusion, which 
degradesthe efficiency of identifying bad nodes. In 
fact, if a set of badnodes collude together most of 
time, only one of these nodescan be identified. 
 
Fig. 4 Detection of collisions 
CONCLUSION 
In this proposed a simple yet effective scheme to 
identifymisbehaving forwarders that drop or modify 
packets. Novel Packet Droppers with Reform in 
Multi-Hop Sensor networksextensive analysis and 
simulations have been conducted and verified the 
effectiveness in various scenarios. 
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